VIENNA, Nov 13 – Iran has told the United Nations nuclear watchdog that negotiations over restarting international inspections of its nuclear facilities cannot move forward while the country continues to face threats of military action, raising further concerns about the future of nuclear monitoring and transparency surrounding Tehran’s atomic program.
In a communication to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) earlier this month, Iran argued that the security conditions necessary for inspectors to return to its nuclear facilities have not been restored. Tehran specifically pointed to repeated public warnings by the President of the United States about the possibility of additional military operations against Iran, particularly strikes targeting its nuclear infrastructure.
The Iranian government described the threats as a major obstacle to discussions about restoring inspection arrangements. It maintained that meaningful progress would remain impossible until the circumstances that created the current dispute were addressed and the necessary legal and practical conditions for normal nuclear safeguards activities were re-established.
The position was outlined in a confidential IAEA report circulated among member states on Friday. The document indicates that disagreements over security, access and the handling of sensitive nuclear information continue to complicate efforts to restore international oversight of Iran’s nuclear activities.
Despite its objections, Tehran reiterated that it remained committed to meeting its international safeguards obligations. Iran said it was prepared to resume full cooperation with the agency once the relevant conditions made it possible.
The IAEA, however, warned that the prolonged absence of inspections and the lack of reliable information about Iran’s nuclear material represent a serious non-proliferation concern. The agency said the situation requires urgent attention and emphasized that its inspectors are prepared to return to Iran at short notice.
The dispute comes after Iranian nuclear facilities were targeted during the 12-day war between Israel and Iran in June 2025. The United States also participated in attacks against key Iranian nuclear installations during the conflict, leaving several facilities damaged and disrupting the monitoring arrangements previously maintained by international inspectors.
Since those attacks, Iran has not permitted IAEA inspectors to access the affected nuclear sites. Consequently, the agency has been unable to establish the current condition of several facilities or independently verify the status and location of Iran’s stockpile of uranium enriched to levels close to weapons-grade purity.
The inspection restrictions have created significant uncertainty for international authorities seeking to determine how much nuclear material Iran possesses, where it is being stored and whether its nuclear activities remain within the limits of its stated civilian program.
The IAEA said its ability to verify Iran’s nuclear activities has been substantially restricted. Although the agency has maintained some access to the country’s nuclear infrastructure, its monitoring efforts remain far below the level necessary to provide a complete assessment.
Iran has also raised objections over what it considers risks to the confidentiality of sensitive nuclear information. In a separate letter to the agency, Tehran expressed concern about a recent American offer of rewards worth up to $20 million for information related to Iran’s nuclear program.
The Iranian government argued that the confidentiality of information gathered through international nuclear monitoring must be protected. It warned against the possibility that sensitive details could be disclosed, misused or exploited, stressing that safeguards activities should remain focused on their technical and verification responsibilities.
The issue adds another layer of tension to an already difficult relationship between Tehran and the IAEA. Iran has repeatedly criticized the agency’s handling of information concerning its nuclear program, while the watchdog has maintained that independent access and verification are essential to ensuring international confidence.
In response to the continuing impasse, the IAEA encouraged Iran to consider technical arrangements that could gradually restore inspection activities. Such measures could provide a possible starting point for renewed cooperation without requiring an immediate return to the previous monitoring framework.
The agency’s report also identified the Bushehr nuclear power plant as the only Iranian nuclear facility inspected since the June 2025 conflict. IAEA inspectors visited the site between September 12 and September 15, conducting an inspection of the country’s operating nuclear power installation.
The Bushehr reactor currently in operation uses uranium supplied by Russia and enriched to approximately 4.5% purity. This enrichment level is considered relatively low and is commonly used as fuel for civilian nuclear power generation.
However, the inspection of Bushehr has not resolved the agency’s concerns about other parts of Iran’s nuclear infrastructure, particularly facilities involved in uranium enrichment and the storage of highly enriched material.
IAEA Raises Concerns Over Isfahan Facility and Uranium Stockpile
One of the most significant issues highlighted in the latest report concerns the Isfahan Fuel Enrichment Plant, a facility about which the IAEA says it still lacks essential information.
Iran notified the nuclear watchdog about the facility in June 2025, shortly before the beginning of the joint American and Israeli airstrikes against Iranian nuclear installations. Inspectors had been scheduled to visit the site on the day the military operation began.
However, the planned inspection was canceled after the strikes started, preventing the agency from carrying out its intended assessment.
According to the IAEA, it still does not know the facility’s exact location or whether nuclear material is present at the site. The agency described its uncertainty as an increasing concern, particularly because it cannot independently establish what activities may have taken place there or determine whether the facility was affected by subsequent military operations.
The lack of information about Isfahan illustrates the wider difficulties facing international inspectors. Without access to relevant facilities and supporting records, the agency cannot provide a comprehensive account of Iran’s nuclear activities or verify the condition of materials that may have been stored at locations targeted during the conflict.
The broader situation is further complicated by the size and enrichment level of Iran’s uranium stockpile.
According to figures previously provided by the IAEA, Iran had accumulated approximately 440.9 kilograms (972 pounds) of uranium enriched to 60% purity. This material is significantly more enriched than the uranium normally required for civilian nuclear power generation and is technically closer to weapons-grade uranium, which is generally defined as material enriched to approximately 90%.
IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi has previously warned that the quantity of highly enriched uranium held by Iran could theoretically provide enough material for as many as 10 nuclear weapons if Tehran decided to pursue weaponization.
However, Grossi has also emphasized that possessing sufficient enriched uranium does not mean a country has already developed nuclear weapons. Producing a functioning nuclear weapon requires additional technical processes, equipment and expertise beyond uranium enrichment.
The agency’s inability to verify the stockpile since the June 2025 attacks has therefore become one of the central concerns in the international dispute.
Under IAEA monitoring guidelines, nuclear material enriched to such high levels would normally be subject to regular verification, generally on a monthly basis. The interruption of those inspections has left the agency without the information needed to establish whether the reported quantities remain accurate or where the material is currently located.
Iran has consistently maintained that its nuclear program is intended for peaceful purposes, including electricity generation and other civilian applications. Tehran rejects accusations that it is developing nuclear weapons and has argued that its nuclear activities fall within its sovereign rights and international obligations.
Western governments and the IAEA, however, have continued to express concerns about the country’s nuclear history. The agency and several Western nations have said Iran operated an organized nuclear weapons program until 2003, although Tehran has denied seeking to develop an atomic bomb.
The latest disagreement is unfolding against the background of renewed military confrontation. Israel and the United States launched a 12-day campaign against Iran in June 2025, striking several nuclear installations and other strategic targets. The full extent of the damage to Iran’s nuclear infrastructure has remained difficult to establish because of restrictions on international access.
Military action escalated again on February 28, 2026, when the United States and Israel launched another series of strikes against Iran. The attacks killed Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and several other senior Iranian officials.
The February operation targeted multiple military installations, including Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps command facilities, air defense systems, missile and drone launch locations, and military airfields.
These developments have further complicated diplomatic efforts to address concerns about Iran’s nuclear activities. With military threats continuing and inspection arrangements still unresolved, the possibility of restoring comprehensive international monitoring remains uncertain.
For the IAEA, the immediate challenge is to regain access to facilities and nuclear materials that have not been independently verified for months. For Iran, the priority appears to be securing assurances that its nuclear infrastructure will not face further attacks and that information obtained through international inspections will remain confidential.
Both issues will likely remain central to any future negotiations. Until an arrangement is reached, the international community will continue to face significant gaps in its understanding of Iran’s nuclear program, including the condition of damaged facilities, the whereabouts of enriched uranium and the activities taking place at sites that inspectors have not been able to examine.
Iran’s latest communication signals that it is not ruling out a return to full inspections. However, its insistence that security conditions must first improve suggests that restoring international oversight will require more than technical agreements between Tehran and the nuclear watchdog. It will also depend on wider diplomatic efforts to address the military and political tensions surrounding Iran’s nuclear program.