MADRID, Sep 9 – Spain’s National Intelligence Center issued several warnings in the days immediately before a huge influx of migrants reached the Spanish enclave of Ceuta from Morocco, according to a collection of government documents released Wednesday. The records provide a detailed account of what Spanish authorities knew before the border crisis and appear to challenge Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez’s description of the warnings available to his government.
The government released 40 declassified documents containing intelligence assessments, alerts, communications, charts and reports produced by several Spanish law enforcement and intelligence agencies. Together, they show that Spanish authorities were monitoring online calls for a mass attempt to enter Ceuta and had been informed about possible plans involving both the border fence and the sea.
The documents do not establish that Spanish authorities knew precisely how large the movement would become or that Morocco’s government had organized the influx. But they do show that warnings about a possible coordinated attempt to enter Ceuta had reached Spanish officials before thousands of migrants began arriving.
The revelations have added to political pressure on Sánchez’s government, which has faced criticism over its response to the crisis and its relationship with Morocco. Opposition politicians have questioned whether authorities acted quickly enough despite receiving intelligence about possible crossings.
The disclosures come as Ceuta continues to deal with the consequences of the mass arrival, including a prolonged humanitarian situation involving thousands of migrants who remained in the small Spanish territory after the initial border rush.
Intelligence Warnings Came Before the Mass Arrival
One of the most significant documents dates to July 29, one day before the largest movement began. On that day, Spain’s National Intelligence Center sent a warning through WhatsApp to the Spanish government’s delegation in Ceuta after monitoring calls circulating on social media.
The message warned of an expected assault on the border fence and a possible attempt to reach the territory by sea the following evening. The intelligence agency also highlighted the size of the online campaign, saying two separate groups involved in promoting the crossing had a combined following of about 180,000 people.
A separate intelligence report sent to Moroccan intelligence officials the same day described social media discussions encouraging migrants to enter Ceuta on July 30. According to the document, possible routes included climbing the fence separating the Spanish territory from Morocco or swimming around the barrier.
The report also pointed to Morocco’s Throne Day, a national celebration held on July 30, as a factor that migrants might take into account when attempting to cross.
Spain’s intelligence agency also sent warnings to the Civil Guard, the country’s border and law enforcement force. Those communications referred to several Facebook and WhatsApp groups that were encouraging people to attempt the crossing.
The warnings are particularly significant because they were issued shortly before the border became overwhelmed. In the days leading up to the mass movement, hundreds of migrants had already attempted to reach Ceuta by swimming from Morocco.
Spain’s Interior Minister Fernando Grande-Marlaska acknowledged at the time that the authorities were facing an unusual situation. He described the circumstances as an “extraordinary, exceptional situation” and said the government was responding with the resources already permanently deployed in Ceuta.
By July 30, however, the number of arrivals had increased dramatically. More than 72,000 people were reported to have attempted to reach the Spanish city, overwhelming local authorities and creating a major humanitarian and security challenge.
A Defense Ministry intelligence report prepared on July 30 also offered a critical assessment of Morocco’s response. It said Moroccan forces had remained passive and had acted negligently in preventing migrants from reaching the border.
The report further warned that Morocco could potentially use the developing situation in Ceuta to advance its broader strategic interests.
Morocco’s foreign ministry did not immediately respond to questions about the newly released documents.
The question of Morocco’s role has been particularly sensitive in Spain. Sánchez said previously that there was no evidence that the Moroccan government had orchestrated the mass crossing. His position came under renewed scrutiny after a leaked police report alleged that Moroccan police had played a role in the episode.
The government’s release of the intelligence material was intended in part to provide a clearer account of the events and the information available to Spanish institutions before the crisis unfolded.
Sánchez, however, rejected the suggestion that the documents demonstrate that his government had been given adequate warning of an operation on the scale that eventually occurred.
In a statement posted on X, the Spanish prime minister said authorities had been aware of the social media campaign and had been monitoring it. But he argued that the information did not indicate the eventual scale, nature or likelihood of the mass movement.
That distinction is now at the center of the political dispute. The intelligence reports clearly demonstrate that Spanish agencies were aware of online mobilization and possible attempts to enter Ceuta. What remains contested is whether those warnings were specific enough to predict the extraordinary size of the movement and justify a substantially different response.
The released documents include material from multiple agencies, providing a timeline of how authorities tracked the growing number of migrants before and during the border crisis. They also show that the number of people arriving increased rapidly enough to overwhelm the resources available in the territory.
Ceuta Faces Continuing Humanitarian Pressure
The immediate border crisis subsided after the initial rush, but the consequences continued well beyond the first days. Spanish national authorities estimated that around 5,000 migrants remained in Ceuta several weeks after the mass arrival, while local officials placed the number considerably higher, at as many as 10,000.
The small Spanish territory, located on Morocco’s northern coast, has long been one of Europe’s most sensitive migration points. Its land border with Morocco makes it a potential entry route for migrants seeking access to Spain and, ultimately, the European Union.
The scale of the July crisis placed exceptional pressure on local services, shelters and law enforcement agencies. It also intensified an already contentious political debate in Spain over migration policy and relations with Morocco.
The government’s decision to declassify the intelligence material followed a pledge by Sánchez to make records related to the country’s deadliest mass crossing available for public scrutiny. Non-governmental organizations reported that more than 140 migrants died in connection with the episode, adding another layer of concern over how the border was managed.
The documents released Wednesday do not provide a simple answer to the questions surrounding the crisis. They show that intelligence officials had identified warning signs before the mass movement, but they also leave room for disagreement over how those warnings should have been interpreted.
For Sánchez, the distinction between knowing that a crossing was being promoted online and knowing that tens of thousands of people would attempt it is central to his defense. His government maintains that the intelligence did not accurately predict the scale of the events that followed.
For critics, however, the existence of multiple warnings raises questions about whether authorities underestimated the seriousness of the threat. The references to large social media groups, planned crossings by land and sea, and the timing of the proposed operation suggest that Spanish agencies had more information than was publicly known at the time.
The controversy is therefore likely to continue beyond the release of the documents. Spain still faces questions about its preparedness for sudden migration surges, its handling of the Ceuta border and the role of Morocco in managing movement toward Spanish territory.
The declassified records have provided the public with a fuller picture of the information circulating inside Spanish institutions before the crisis. They also highlight the difficult judgment authorities faced in deciding whether warnings of a potential border breach represented a manageable security concern or the beginning of an unprecedented mass movement.
As political scrutiny continues, the central issue is no longer simply whether Spain received warnings. The documents make clear that it did. The more difficult question is whether those warnings should have led officials to anticipate the extraordinary events that unfolded in Ceuta on July 30 and 31.