Any Trump Deal with Iran Must Address Nuclear Watchdog Blind Spots

VIENNA, June 3 – The ongoing discourse surrounding Iran’s nuclear ambitions has once again taken center stage in international negotiations, particularly as U.S. policymakers revisit strategies to contain Tehran’s atomic progress. President Donald Trump’s withdrawal from the 2015 nuclear agreement left a substantial vacuum in oversight and compliance mechanisms, creating knowledge gaps that the United Nations’ atomic watchdog is still struggling to fill. As fresh talks emerge with the possibility of a renewed deal under Trump’s foreign policy approach, one thing is clear: any new agreement must directly address and rectify the blind spots that have compromised global oversight of Iran’s nuclear activities.

Missing Links in Monitoring: The Unseen Dimensions of Iran’s Nuclear Development

One of the starkest examples of the oversight failures came to light when international inspectors watched truckloads of advanced IR-6 centrifuges being delivered to the Fordow nuclear facility, a heavily fortified site nestled in a mountain south of Tehran. Although Iran formally notified the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) about the planned installation of hundreds of these machines, the inspectors were left in the dark about their origin. This incident represents a broader issue — a breakdown in visibility over Iran’s nuclear supply chain and enrichment operations.

Since the collapse of the 2015 agreement, the IAEA has struggled to maintain a clear picture of Iran’s capabilities. Inspectors have lost access to key monitoring tools, such as surveillance cameras at sensitive sites, and the ability to conduct surprise inspections at undeclared locations. Iran’s refusal to share data recorded by the now-removed monitoring equipment has further eroded confidence in the transparency of its program.

Reports show that the agency no longer knows the exact number of centrifuges that exist, where they are produced, or where they are stored. While Iran continues to allow limited inspections under its basic Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) obligations, the broader framework of enhanced verification and monitoring has been dismantled.

Breakout Time Shrinks as Iran Boosts Enrichment

In the years since the U.S. exited the original pact, Iran has made considerable progress in its uranium enrichment capabilities. The 2015 nuclear agreement limited uranium enrichment to just 3.67% purity, significantly below the level required for making nuclear weapons. Now, Iran is enriching uranium up to 60%, inching dangerously close to the 90% mark necessary for nuclear weaponization.

According to a confidential assessment shared recently with diplomats, Iran has amassed enough enriched uranium to produce several nuclear weapons if it chose to take that step. This is unprecedented — no other nation has enriched to such a high level without eventually developing nuclear arms.

A European diplomat familiar with the matter noted that Iran’s enrichment program has reached such a level of sophistication that even a complete shutdown would be reversible within months. The nation’s mastery over advanced centrifuge designs and domestic production capacity gives it a rapid rebound potential in case of future restrictions.

This progress poses a new challenge for negotiators: the old metrics of ensuring a one-year breakout time are no longer realistic. Instead, any forthcoming agreement would need to focus on restoring comprehensive and credible oversight, especially by re-establishing full IAEA access to production sites, stockpiles, and development centers.

Iran’s Resistance to U.S. Demands and the Challenge Ahead

One of the major sticking points in the ongoing discussions is Iran’s unwillingness to abandon enrichment entirely or to ship its enriched uranium abroad. These demands, championed by the U.S., are viewed by Iran as overreaching and inconsistent with its rights under the NPT. Iran maintains that its nuclear pursuits are peaceful, rejecting allegations that it aims to build a nuclear bomb.

Despite these assurances, Iran’s actions suggest a different trajectory. The removal of IAEA surveillance equipment, refusal to share stored footage, and continued enrichment activity at once-banned sites like Fordow have deepened international skepticism.

Years ago, the 2015 deal required Iran to grant the IAEA access not only to declared enrichment facilities but also to workshops producing centrifuge components and storage areas for raw materials like yellowcake. That level of transparency is now absent, and the IAEA has admitted it has lost “continuity of knowledge” in several key areas.

Rebuilding the Baseline: A Daunting Task

If a new deal is to succeed, it must begin with the establishment of a new monitoring baseline. This means reconstructing a full picture of Iran’s nuclear activities, despite the time that has elapsed and the information that may never be recovered. Experts in the field agree that without this baseline, the world will be operating with only partial visibility, leaving room for doubt and potential deception.

Creating this baseline will require Iran’s cooperation — something that remains uncertain given the political climate and mutual distrust. The IAEA will need unrestricted access, a reliable chain of data, and real-time monitoring tools to offer assurances that Iran’s nuclear program is indeed peaceful.

A former U.S. intelligence official now working at a nuclear security organization emphasized the risks: even with a new agreement, some uncertainty will likely remain. The crucial question, then, becomes whether this level of uncertainty is tolerable for the United States and its allies.

Oversight Before Agreement

As negotiations unfold, it’s imperative that any deal — whether brokered under Trump administration or another — does not repeat the oversight failures of the past. A meaningful agreement must go beyond temporary caps and instead ensure robust, continuous, and transparent monitoring by the IAEA.

Without tackling the blind spots head-on, no deal can truly be called a safeguard against nuclear proliferation. The world cannot afford to turn a blind eye to the unknowns that continue to cloud Iran’s nuclear program.

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